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Abstract 
Whether or not the marginal product of capital (MPK) differs across countries is a question 
that keeps coming up in discussions of comparative economic development and patterns of 
capital flows. We use easily accessible macroeconomic data to shed light on this issue, and 
find that MPKs are remarkably similar across countries. Hence, there is no prima facie 
support for the view that international credit frictions play a major role in preventing capital 
flows from rich to poor countries. Lower capital ratios in these countries are instead 
attributable to lower endowments of complementary factors and lower efficiency, as well as 
to lower prices of output goods relative to capital. We also show that properly accounting for 
the share of income accruing to reproducible capital is critical to reach these conclusions. 
One implication of our findings is that increased aid flows to developing countries will not 
significantly increase these countries' incomes. 
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1 Introduction
Is the world’s capital stock efficiently allocated across countries? If so, then all countries
have roughly the same aggregate marginal product of capital (MPK). If not, theMPK
will vary substantially from country to country. In the latter case, the world foregoes
an opportunity to increase global GDP by reallocating capital from low to high MPK
countries. The policy implications are far reaching.
Given the enormous cross-country differences in observed capital-labor ratios
(they vary by a factor of 100 in the data used in this paper) it may seem obvious that the
MPK must vary dramatically as well. In this case we would have to conclude that there
are important frictions in international capital markets that prevent an efficient cross-
country allocation of capital.1 However, as Lucas (1990) pointed out in his celebrated
article, poor countries also have lower endowments of factors complementary with
physical capital, such as human capital, and lower total factor productivity (TFP).
Hence, large differences in capital-labor ratios may coexist with MPK equalization.2
It is not surprising then that considerable effort and ingenuity have been de-
voted to the attempt to generate cross-country estimates of the MPK. Banerjee and
Duflo (2005) present an exhaustive review of existing methods and results. Briefly,
the literature has followed three approaches. The first is the cross-country compar-
ison of interest rates. This is problematic because in financially repressed/distorted
economies interest rates on financial assets may be very poor proxies for the cost of
capital actually borne by firms.3 The second is some variant of regressing ∆Y on ∆K
for different sets of counties and comparing the coefficient on ∆K. Unfortunately, this
approach typically relies on unrealistic identification assumptions. The third strategy
1The credit-friction view has many vocal supporters. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), for example,
build a strong case based on developing countries’ histories of serial default, as well as evidence by
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcam, and Volosovych (2003) and Lane (2003) linking institutional factors to capital
flows to poorer economies. Another forceful exposition of the credit-friction view is in Stulz (2005).
2See also Mankiw (1995), and the literature on development-accounting [surveyed in Caselli (2005)],
which documents these large differences in human capital and TFP.
3Another issue is default. In particular, it is not uncommon for promised yields on “emerging
market” bond instruments to exceed yields on US bonds by a factor of 2 or 3, but given the much
higher risk these bonds carry it is possible that the expected cost of capital from the perspective of
the borrower is considerably less. More generally, Mulligan (2002) shows that with uncertainty and
taste shocks interest rates on any particular financial instruments may have very low – indeed even
negative – correlations with the rental rate faced by firms.
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is calibration, which involves choosing a functional form for the relationship between
physical capital and output, as well as accurately measuring the additional complemen-
tary factors – such as human capital and TFP – that affect the MPK. Since giving a
full account of the complementary factors is quite ambitious, one may not want to rely
on this method exclusively. Both within and between these three broad approaches
results vary widely. In sum, the effort to generate reliable comparisons of cross-country
MPK differences has not yet paid off.
This paper presents estimates of the aggregateMPK for a large cross-section of
countries, representing a broad sample of developing and developed economies. Rela-
tive to existing alternative measures, ours are extremely direct, impose extremely little
structure on the data, and are extremely simple to calculate. The general idea is that
under conditions approximating perfect competition on the capital market the MPK
equals the rate of return to capital, and that the latter multiplied by the capital stock
equals capital income. Hence, the aggregate marginal product of capital can be easily
recovered from data on total income, the value of the capital stock, and the capital
share in income. We then combine data on output and capital with data on the capital
share to back out the MPK.4
Our main result is thatMPKs are essentially equalized: the return from invest-
ing in capital is no higher in poor countries than in rich countries. This means that one
can rationalize virtually all of the cross-country variation in capital per worker without
appealing to international capital-market frictions. We also quantify the output losses
due to the (minimal) MPK differences we observe: if we were to reallocate capital
across countries so as to equalize MPKs the corresponding change in world output
would be negligible.5 Consistent with the view that financial markets have become
more integrated worldwide, however, we also find some evidence that the cost of credit
frictions has declined over time.
The path to this result offers additional important insights. We start from a
“naive” estimate of theMPK that is derived from the standard neoclassical one-sector
model, with labor and reproducible capital as the only inputs. Using this initial mea-
sure, the average MPK in the developing economies in our sample is more than twice
4Mulligan (2002) performs an analogous calculation to identify the rental rate in the US time series.
He finds implicit support for this method in the fact that the rental rate thus calculated is a much
better predictor of consumption growth than interest rates on financial assets.
5Our counter-factual calculations of the consequences of full capital mobility for world GDP are
analogous to those of Klein and Ventura (2004) for labor mobility.
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as large as in the developed economies. Furthermore, within the developing-country
sample the MPK is three times as variable as within the developed-country sample.
When we quantify the output losses associated with these MPK differentials we find
that they are very large (about 25 percent of the aggregate GDP of the developing
countries in our sample). These results seem at first glance to represent a big win for
the international credit-friction view of the world.
Things begin to change dramatically when we add land and other natural re-
sources as possible inputs. This obviously realistic modification implies that standard
measures of the capital share (obtained as 1 minus the labor share) are not appropriate
to build a measure of the marginal productivity of reproducible capital. This is because
these measures conflate the income flowing to capital accumulated through investment
flows with natural capital in the form of land and natural resources. By using data
recently compiled by the World Bank, we are able to separate natural capital from re-
producible capital and calculate the share of output paid to reproducible capital that
is our object of interest. This correction alone significantly reduces the gap between
rich and poor country capital returns. The main reason for this is that poor countries
have a larger share of natural capital in total capital, which leads to a correspondingly
larger overestimate of the income and marginal-productivity of reproducible capital
when using the total capital-income share. The correction also reduces the GDP loss
due to MPK differences to a fraction of the amount implied by the naive calculation.6
The further and final blow to the credit-friction hypothesis comes from gener-
alizing the model to allow for multiple sectors. In a multi-sector world the estimate of
MPK based on the one-sector model (with or without natural capital) is – at best –
a proxy for the average physical MPK across sectors. But with many sectors physical
MPK differences can be sustained even in a world completely unencumbered by any
form of capital-market friction. In particular, even if poor-country agents have access to
unlimited borrowing and lending at the same conditions offered to rich-country agents,
the physicalMPK will be higher in poor countries if the relative price of capital goods
is higher there. Intuitively, poor-country investors in physical capital need to be com-
pensated by a higher physical MPK for the fact that capital is more expensive there
6We are immensely grateful to Pete Klenow and two referees for bringing up the issue of land
and natural resources. Incidentally, these observations extend to a criticism of much work that has
automatically plugged in standard capital-share estimates in empirical applications of models where
all capital is reproducible. We plan to pursue this criticism in future work.
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(relative to output). Or, yet in other words, the physical MPK measures output per
unit of physical capital invested, while for the purposes of cross-country credit flows
one wants to look at output per unit of output invested. Accordingly, when we correct
our measure to capture the higher relative cost of capital in poor countries we reach
our result of MPK equalization.7
We close the paper by returning to Lucas’ question as to the sources of differ-
ences in capital-labor ratios. Lucas proposed two main candidates: credit frictions –
about which he was skeptical – and differences in complementary inputs (e.g. human
capital) and TFP. Our analysis highlights the wisdom of Lucas’ skepticism vis-a-vis
the credit friction view. However, our result that physical MPKs differ implies that
different endowments of complementary factors or of TFP are not the only cause of
differences in capital intensity. Instead, an important role is also played by a third
proximate factor: the higher relative price of capital in poor countries. When we
decompose differences in capital-labor ratios to find the relative contributions of com-
plementary factors and relative prices we find a roughly 50-50 split among the two: the
higher cost of installing capital (in terms of foregone consumption) in poor countries
is as important as their lower overall endowment of other factors in explaining why so
little capital flows to them.8
The important role of the relative price of capital in our analysis underscores
the close relationship of our contribution with an influential recent paper by Hsieh and
Klenow (2003). Hsieh and Klenow show, among other things, that the relative price
of output is the key source for the observed positive correlation of real investment
rates and per-capita income, despite roughly constant investment rates in domestic
prices. We extend their results by drawing out their implications – together with
appropriately-measured reproducible capital shares – for rates of return differentials,
7In a paper largely addressing other issues, Taylor (1998) has a section which makes the same basic
point about price differences and returns to capital, and presents similar calculations for the MPKs.
Our paper still differs considerably in that it provides a more rigorous theoretical underpinning for the
exercise; it provides a quantitative model-based assessment of the deadweight costs of credit frictions;
and it presents a decomposition of the role of relative prices v. other factors in explaining cross-
country differences in capital-labor ratios. Perhaps most importantly, in this paper we use actual data
on reproducible capital shares instead of assuming that these are constant across countries and equal
to the total capital share. This turns out to be quite important. Cohen and Soto (2002) also briefly
observe that the data may be roughly consistent with rate of return equalization.
8A small role is also played by cross-country differences in the reproducible-capital share in income.
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and the debate on the missing capital flows to developing countries.9
Our results have implications for the recently-revived policy debate on financial
aid to developing countries. The existence of large physicalMPK differentials between
poor and rich countries would usually be interpreted as prima facie support to the
view that increased aid flows may be beneficial. But such an interpretation hinges on
a credit-friction explanation for such differentials. Our result that financial rates of
return are fairly similar in rich and poor countries, instead, implies that any additional
flow of resources to developing countries is likely to be offset by private flows in the
opposite direction seeking to restore rate-of-return equalization.10
2 MPK Differentials
2.1 MPK Differentials in a One-Sector Model
Consider the standard neoclassical one-sector model featuring a constant-return pro-
duction function and perfectly competitive (domestic) capital markets. Under these
(minimal) conditions the rental rate of capital equals the marginal product of capital,
so that aggregate capital income is MPKxK, where K is the capital stock. If α is the
capital share in GDP, and Y is GDP, we then have α =MPKxK/Y , or
MPK = α
Y
K
. (1)
9Another important contribution of Hsieh and Klenow (2003) is to propose an explanation for
the observed pattern of relative prices. In their view poor countries have relatively lower TFP in
producing (largely tradable) capital goods than in producing (partially non-tradable) consumption
goods. Another possible explanation is that poor countries tax sales of machinery relatively more
than sales of final goods [e.g. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996)]. Relative price differences may
also reflect differences in the composition of output or in unmeasured quality. None of our conclusions
in this paper is affected by which of these explanations is the correct one, so we do not take a stand
on this.
10Our conclusion that a more integrated world financial market would not lead to major changes in
world output is in a sense stronger than Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003)’s conclusion that the welfare
effects of capital-account openness are small. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003) find large (calibrated)
MPK differentials, and consequently predict large capital inflows following capital-account liberaliza-
tion. However, they point out that in welfare terms this merely accelerates a process of convergence
to a steady state that is independent of whether the capital-account is open or closed. Hence, the
discounted welfare gains are modest. Our point is that, even though differences in physical MPKs
are large, differences in rates of return are small, so we should not even expect much of a reallocation
of capital in the first place.
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In the macro-development literature it is common to back out the “capital
share” as one minus available estimates of the labor share in income (we review these
data below). But such figures include payments accruing to both reproducible and non-
reproducible capital, i.e. land and natural resources. By contrast, the standard measure
of the capital stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory method from investment
flows, and therefore represents only the reproducible capital stock. As is clear from
the formula above, therefore, using standard measures of α leads to an overestimate of
the marginal productivity of reproducible capital. In turn, this bias on the estimated
levels of the MPKs will translate into a twofold bias in cross-country comparisons.
First, it will exaggerate absolute differences in MPK, which is typically the kind of
differences we are interested in when comparing rates of return on assets (interest-rate
spreads, for example, are absolute differences).11 Second, and most importantly, since
the agricultural and natural-resource sectors represent a much larger share of GDP in
poor countries, the overestimate of the MPK when using the total capital share is
much more severe in such countries, and cross-country differences will once again be
inflated (both in absolute and in relative terms).
Of course equation (1) holds (as long as there is only one sector) whether or not
non-reproducible capital enters the production function or not. The only thing that
changes is the interpretation of α. Hence, these considerations lead us to two possible
estimates of the MPK:
MPKN = αw
Y
K
,
and
MPKL = αk
Y
K
.
In these formulas, Y andK are, respectively, estimates of real output and the reproducible-
capital stock; αw is one minus the labor share (the standard measure of the capital
share); and αk is an estimate of the reproducible-capital share in income. The suffix
“N” in the first measure is a mnemonic for “naive,” while the suffix “L” in the second
stands for “land and natural-resource corrected.”
It is important to observe that, relative to alternative estimates in the literature,
11As an example, suppose that all countries have the same share of land and natural resources in
the total capital share, say 20%. Using the total-capital share instead of the reproducible-capital will
simply increase all the MPKs by the same proportion. If the US’ “true” MPK is 8% and India’s
16% (a spread of 8 percentage points), the MPKs computed with the total capital share are 10% and
20% (a spread of 10 percentage points).
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this method of calculating MPK requires no functional form assumptions (other than
linear homogeneity), much less that we come up with estimates of human capital, TFP,
or other factors that affect a country’s MPK. Furthermore, the assumptions we do
make are typically shared by the other approaches to MPK estimation, so the set of
restrictions we impose is a strict subset of those imposed elsewhere.12 This calculation
is a useful basis for our other calculations because it encompasses the most conventional
set of assumptions in the growth literature.
2.2 MPK Differentials in a Multi-Sector Model
The calculations suggested above are potentially biased because they ignore an impor-
tant fact – the price of capital relative to the price of consumption goods is higher in
poor countries than in rich countries. To see why this matters consider an economy
that produces J final goods. Each final good is produced using capital and other fac-
tors, which we don’t need to specify. The only technological restriction is that each
of the final goods is produced under constant returns to scale. The only institutional
restriction is that there is perfect competition in good and factor markets within each
country. Capital may be produced domestically (in which case it is one of the J final
goods), imported, or both. Similarly, it does not matter whether the other final goods
produced domestically are tradable or not.
Consider the decision by a firm or a household to purchase a piece of equipment
and use it in the production of one of the final goods, say good 1. The return from
this transaction is
P1(t)MPK1(t) + Pk(t+ 1)(1− δ)
Pk(t)
,
where P1(t) is the domestic price of good 1 at time t, Pk(t) is the domestic price of
capital goods, δ is the depreciation rate, and MPK1 is the physical marginal product
of capital in the production of good 1. When do we have frictionless international
capital markets? When the firms/households contemplating this investment in all
countries have access to an alternative investment opportunity, that yields a common
world interest rate R∗. Abstracting for simplicity from capital gains, then, frictionless
12This is not to say that these restrictions are innocuous, of course. For example, we rule out
adjustment costs to the stock of capital – which in certain models could drive a wedge between the
rental rate on capital and the MPK.
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international capital markets imply
P1MPK1
Pk
= R∗ − (1− δ). (2)
Hence, frictionless international credit markets imply that the value of the marginal
product of capital in any particular final good, divided by the price of capital, is
constant across countries.
To bring this condition to the data let us first note that total capital income
is
∑
j PjMPKjKj, where Kj is the amount of capital used in producing good j. If
capital is efficiently allocated domestically, we also have PjMPKj = P1MPK1, so total
capital income is P1MPK1
∑
j Kj = P1MPK1K, where K is the total capital stock in
operation in the country. Given that capital income is P1MPK1K, the capital share
in income is α = P1MPK1K/(PyY ) ,where PyY is GDP evaluated at domestic prices.
Hence, the following holds:
P1MPK1
Pk
=
αPyY
PkK
In other words, the multi-sector model recommends a measure of the marginal product
of capital that is easily backed out from an estimate of the capital share in income, α,
GDP at domestic prices, PyY , and the capital-stock at domestic prices, PkK. Compar-
ing this with the estimate suggested by the one-sector model [equation (1)] we see that
the difference lies in correcting for the relative price of final-to-capital goods, Py/Pk.
It should be clear that this correction is fundamental to properly assess the hypothesis
that international credit markets are frictionless.
All of the above goes through whether or not reproducible capital is the only
recipient of non-labor income or not. Again, the only difference is in the interpretation
of the capital share α. Hence, we come to our third and fourth possible estimates of
the MPK:
PMPKN =
αwPyY
PkK
,
and
PMPKL =
αkPyY
PkK
where Py/Pk is a measure of the average price of final goods relative to the price of
reproducible capital, and the prefix “P” stands for “price-corrected.”13
13Since in our model PjMPKj is equalized across sectors j, the physical MPK in any particular
sector will be an inverse function of the price of output in that sector. Since the relative price of
capital is high in poor countries, this is consistent with the conjecture of Hsieh and Klenow (2003)
that relative productivity in the capital goods producing sectors is low in poor countries.
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Notice that the one-sector based measures, MPKN and MPKL, retain some
interest even in the multi-sector context. In particular, one can show that
αY
K
=
1∑
j
Yj/Y
MPKj
.
In words, the product of the capital share and real income, divided by the capital
stock, tends to increase when physical marginal products tend to be high on average
in the various sectors.14 Hence, the one-sector based measures offer some quantitative
assessment of cross-country differences in the average physical MPK.
2.3 Data
Our data on Y , K, Py, and Pk come (directly or indirectly) from Version 6.1 of the
Penn World Tables [PWT, Heston, Summers, and Aten (2004)]. Briefly, Y is GDP
in purchasing power parity (PPP) in 1996. K is constructed with the perpetual in-
ventory method from time series data on real investment (also from the PWT) using
a depreciation rate of 0.06 [see Caselli (2005) for more details].15 Py is essentially a
weighted average of final-good domestic prices, while Pk is a weighted average of do-
mestic equipment prices. The list of final and equipment goods to be included in the
measure is constant across countries. Hence, Py/Pk is a summary measure of the prices
of final goods relative to equipment goods. As many authors have already pointed out,
capital goods are relatively more expensive in poor countries, so the free capital flows
condition modified to take account of relative equipment prices should fit the data
better than the unmodified condition if the physical MPK tends to be higher in poor
countries.16
14To obtain this expression start out by the definition of Py, which is
Py =
∑
j PjYj
Y
.
Then substitute Pj =
αPyY
MPKjK
from the last equation in the text, and rearrange.
15A potential bias arises if the depreciation rate δ differs across countries, perhaps because of
differences in the composition of investment, or because the natural environment is more or less
forgiving. In particular we will overestimate the capital stock of countries with high depreciation
rates, and therefore underestimate theirMPK. However notice from equation (2) that countries with
a high depreciation rates should have higher MPKs. In other words variation in δ biases both sides
of (2) in the same direction.
16See, e.g., Barro (1991), Jones (1994), and Hsieh and Klenow (2003) for further discussions of the
price data.
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The total capital share, αw is taken from Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001), who
build upon and expand upon the influential work of Gollin (2002). As mentioned, these
estimates compute the capital share as one minus the labor share in GDP. In turn, the
labor share is employee compensation in the corporate sector from the National Ac-
counts, plus a number of adjustments to include the labor income of the self-employed
and non-corporate employees.17
Direct measures of reproducible capital’s share of output, αk, do not appear
to be available. However, a proxy for them can be constructed from data on wealth,
which has recently become available for a variety of countries from the World Bank
(2006). These data split national wealth into natural capital, such as land and natural
resources, and reproducible capital. If total wealth equals reproducible capital plus
natural wealth, W = PkK + L, then the payments to reproducible capital should be
PkK ∗ r, and payments to natural wealth should be L ∗ r. Reproducible capital’s share
of total capital income is therefore going to be proportional to reproducible capital’s
share of wealth (since all units of wealth pay the same return). So,
αk = (PkK/W ) ∗ αw.
We can therefore back out an estimate of αk from αw as estimated by Bernanke and
Gurkaynak (2001) and PkK/W as estimated by the World Bank.
Since the World Bank’s data on land and natural-resource wealth is by far the
newest and least familiar among those used in this paper, a few more words to describe
these data are probably in order. The general approach is to estimate the value of rents
from a particular form of capital and then capitalize this value using a fixed discount
rate. In most cases, the measure of rents is based on the value of output from that form
17Bernanke and Gu¨rkaynak use similar methods as Gollin, but their data set includes a few more
countries. The numbers are straight from Table X in the Bernanke and Gu¨rkaynak paper. Their
preferred estimates are reported in the column labeled “Actual OSPUE,” and they are constructed by
assigning to labor a share of the Operating Surplus of Private Unincorporate Enterprises equal to the
share of labor in the corporate (and public) sector. We use these data wherever they are available.
When “Actual OSPUE” is not available we take the data from the column “Imputed OSPUE,” which
is constructed as “Actual OSPUE,” except that the OSPUE measure is estimated by breaking down
the sum of OSPUE and total corporate income by assuming that the share of corporate income in
total income is the same as the share of corporate labor in total labor. Finally, when this measure, is
also unavailable, we get the data from the “LF” column, which assumes that average labor income in
the non-corporate sector equals average labor income in the corporate sector. When we use Gollin’s
estimates we get very much the same results.
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of capital in a given year. For subsoil resources, the World Bank also needs to estimate
the future growth of rents and a time horizon to depletion. For forest products, rents are
estimated as the value of timber produced (at local market prices where possible) minus
an estimate of the cost of production. Adjustments are made for sustainability based
on the volume of production and total amount of usable timberland. The rents to other
forest resources are estimated as fixed value per acre for all non-timber forest. Rents
from cropland are estimated as the value of agricultural output minus production costs.
Production costs are taken to be a fixed percentage of output, where that percentage
varies by crop. Pasture land is similarly valued. Protected areas are valued as if they
had the same per-hectare output as crop and pasture land, based on an opportunity cost
argument. Reproducible capital is calculated using the perpetual inventory method.
Due to data limitations, no good estimates of the value of urban land are available. A
very crude estimate values urban land at 24% of the value of reproducible capital.
Table 1: Proportion of Different Types of Wealth in Total Wealth in 2000
Weighted Corr w/
Variable Mean Stdev Median Mean* log(GDP)**
Subsoil Resources 10.5 16.4 1.5 7.0 -0.13
Timber 1.7 2.6 0.8 0.9 -0.34
Other Forest 2.2 5.4 1.1 0.3 -0.49
Cropland 11.4 15.2 5.1 3.2 -0.73
Pasture 4.5 5.4 2.7 1.9 -0.00
Protected Areas 1.9 2.5 0.3 1.4 0.01
Urban Land 13.1 4.6 13.5 16.5 0.70
Reproducible Capital 54.8 19.2 56.3 68.6 0.70
*Weighted by the total value of the capital stock.
** GDP is per worker.
Source: Authors calculations using data from World Bank (2006).
Summary statistics of the cross-country distribution of the shares of different
types of wealth in total wealth are reported in Table 1. In the average country in our
sample, reproducible capital represents roughly one half of total capital, while various
forms of “natural” capital account for the other half. The proportion of reproducible
capital is highly correlated with log GDP per worker. All other types of capital (except
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for urban land, which is calculated as a fraction of accumulated capital) are negatively
correlated with log GDP per worker. Cropland is particularly negatively correlated
with income. The weighted means are weighted by the total capital stock in each
country, so that they give the proportion of each type of capital in the total capital
stock of the World (as represented by our sample). The proportion of reproducible
capital is much higher in the weighted means, with almost 70% of total capital.
Other data sources provide opportunities for checking the broad reliability of
these data. For the US, the OMB published an accounting of land and reproducible
wealth (but not other natural resources) over time [Office of Management and Budget
(2005)]. They find that the proportion of land in total capital varies between 20
and 26% between 1960 and 2003, with no clear trend to the data. This range is
consistent with the World Bank estimate of 26% (when, for comparability with the
OMB estimates, one excludes natural resources other than land). Another check is from
the sectorial dataset on land and capital shares constructed by Caselli and Coleman
(2001). Our approach to estimate the reproducible capital share in GDP implies a
land share in GDP in the US of 8%. According to Caselli and Coleman in the US the
land share in agricultural output is about 20%, and the land share in non-agriculture
is about 6%. Since the share of nonagriculture in GDP is in the order of 97%, these
authors’ overall estimate of the land share in the US is very close to ours.
There are a number of studies from the 60’s and 70’s which perform similar
exercises on a variety of countries. Raymond W. Goldsmith collects some of these in
Goldsmith (1985). He finds land shares in total capital in 1978 that average about
20% across a group of mostly rich countries. With the exception of Japan at 51%,the
figures range from 12% to 27%.18 This range is once again broadly consistent with the
World Bank data.
The data from Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) puts the heaviest constraints
on the sample size, so that we end up with 53 countries.19 The entire data set is
reported in Appendix Table A-1. Capital per worker, k, the relative price Py/Pk, the
total capital share, and the reproducible capital’s share are also plotted against output
18Japan is not similarly an outlier in the World Bank data. This may reflect the relatively crude
way that urban land values is estimated by the World Bank. Lacking a good cross country measure
of urban land value, they simply take urban land to be worth a fixed value of reproducible capital.
Given the population density of Japan this may substantially understate the value of Japanese urban
land.
19For the calculations corrected for the reproducible capital share, we also lose Hong Kong.
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per worker, y, in Appendix Figures A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4.
2.4 MPK Results
In this section we present our four estimates of theMPK. To recap, the naive version,
MPKN , does not account for difference in prices of capital and consumption goods,
and also uses the total share of capital, not the share of reproducible capital. This
calculation is the simplest and will be used as a benchmark for the corrected versions.
MPKL is calculated using the share of reproducible capital rather than the share of
total capital. PMPKN is adjusted to account for differences in prices between capital
and consumption goods, but reverts to the total capital share. Finally PMPKL, the
“right” estimate, includes both the price adjustment and the natural capital adjust-
ment. These four different versions of the implied MPKs are reported in Appendix
Table A-1, and plotted against GDP per worker, y, in Figure 1.
The overall relationship between the naive estimate, MPKN , and income is
clearly negative. However, the non-linearity in the data cannot be ignored: there is a
remarkably neat split whereby the MPKN is highly variable and high on average in
developing countries (up to Malaysia), and fairly constant and low on average among
developed countries (up from Portugal). The average MPKN among the 29 lower
income countries is 27 percent, with a standard deviation of 9 percent. Among the 24
high income countries the average MPKN is 11 percent, with a standard deviation of
3 percent. Neither within the subsample of countries to the left of Portugal, nor in the
one to the right, there is a statistically significant relationship between the MPKN
and y [nor with log(y)].
This first simple calculation implies that the aggregate marginal product of
capital is high and highly variable in poor countries, and low and fairly uniform in rich
countries. If we were to stop here, it would be tempting to conclude that capital flows
fairly freely among the rich countries, but not towards and among the poor countries.
This looks like a big win for the credit friction answer to the Lucas question.
Once one accounts for prices and the share of natural capital a different story
emerges. Figure 1 shows that each of the adjustments reduces the variance of the
marginal product considerably and reduces the differences between the rich and poor
countries. Taking both adjustments together eliminates the variance almost completely
and the rich countries actually have a higher marginal product on average than the
poor countries. Table 2 summarizes the average marginal products for each of our
13
Figure 1: The Marginal Product of Capital
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and Aten (2004), Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001), and World Bank (2006). Authors’ calcu-
lations.
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Table 2: Average Return to Capital in Poor and Rich Countries
Rich Countries Poor Countries
MPKN 11.4 (2.7) 27.2 (9.0)
MPKL 7.5 (1.7) 11.9 (6.9)
PMPKN 12.6 (2.5) 15.7 (5.5)
PMPKL 8.4 (1.9) 6.9 (3.7)
MPKN : naive estimate. MPKL : after correction for natural-capital. PMPKN : after
correction for price differences. PMPKL: after both corrections. Rich (Poor): GDP at least
as large (smaller than) Portugal. Standard Deviations in Parentheses. Authors’ calculations.
calculation for poor and rich countries. The differences between the poor and rich
countries are significant for the first three rows of the table. For the case using both
corrections, the difference is only significant at the 10% level.
Interestingly, with both adjustments there is a positive and significant relation-
ship between PMPKL and output within the low income countries. The very lowest
income countries in our sample have the lowest PMPKL values. This would be con-
sistent with a model where capital flows out of the country were forbidden, and where
some capital flows into the country were not responsive to the rate of return. This may
describe the poorest countries in our sample, where aid flows represent a significant
proportion of investment capital (and all of the inward flow of capital).
3 Assessing the Costs of Credit Frictions
The existence of any cross-country differences in MPK suggests inefficiencies in the
world allocation of capital. How severe are these frictions? One possible way to answer
this question is to compute the amount of GDP the world fails to produce as a con-
sequence. In particular, we perform the counter-factual experiment of reallocating the
world capital stock so as to achieve MPK equalization under our various measures.
We then compare world output under this reallocation to actual world output. The
difference is a measure of the deadweight loss from the failure to equalize MPKs.
We stress that this is not a normative exercise: our capital reallocation is not a
policy proposal. The observed distribution of output is an equilibrium outcome given
certain distortions that prevent MPK equalization. The point of this exercise is to
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assess the welfare losses the world experiences relative to a frictionless first best, not
that the first best is easily achievable by moving some capital around.
While our MPK estimates are free of functional form assumptions, in order
to perform our counterfactual calculations me must now choose a specific production
function. We thus fall back on the standard Cobb-Douglas workhorse. Industry j in
country i has the production function
Yij = Z
βij
ij K
αi
ij (XijLij)
1−αi−βij , (3)
where Zij is the quantity of natural capital, Kij the reproducible capital stock, Lij
the input of labor, βij is the share of natural capital in sector j in country i and
Xij is a summary measure of technology and is also sector and country specific. The
derivation below makes it clear that to pursue our calculations we must assume that
the reproducible-capital share in country i, αi, is the same across all sectors (though
it can vary across countries).
The marginal product of capital in sector j in country i is
MPKij = αiZ
βij
ij K
αi−1
ij (XijLij)
1−αi−βij .
Taking into account the relative prices of capital and consumption goods, rates of
return within a country are equalized when
PMPKij =
Pij
Pk
αiZ
βij
ij K
αi−1
ij (XijLij)
1−αi−βij = PMPKi j = 1...J. (4)
Suppose now that capital was reallocated across countries in such a way that PMPKi
took the same value, PMPK∗, in all countries. Assuming for the time being that Zij,
and Lij are unchanged in response to our counterfactual reshuﬄing of capital (we will
check this is indeed the case later in the section), the new value of Kij, K
∗
ij, satisfies
20
Pij
Pk
αiZ
βij
ij (K
∗
ij)
αi−1(XijLij)1−αi−βij = PMPK∗. (5)
Dividing (5) by (4) we have
K∗ij =
(
PMPKi
PMPK∗
) 1
1−αi
Kij,
20For the remainder of this section, expressions relating to PMPK equalization can be simplified
to expressions for MPK equalization by assuming Pk = Py. Calculations will be performed for both
cases.
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which shows that capital increases or decreases by the same proportion in each sector.
Earlier we made the conjecture that all adjustment to the equalization of PMPKs
was through the capital stock, and not through reallocations of labor or natural capi-
tal. Under this conjecture, since the amount of capital per worker changes by the same
factor in each sector, the marginal products of labor and natural capital must do the
same. Hence, even if labor is not a specific factor, as long as its allocation across sectors
depends on relative wages, there will be no reshuﬄing of workers across sectors.21 The
same is true of natural capital.
We can now aggregate the sectorial capital stocks to the country level:
K∗i =
∑
j
K∗ij =
∑
j
(
PMPKi
PMPK∗
) 1
1−αi
Kij =
(
PMPKi
PMPK∗
) 1
1−αi
Ki (6)
In order to close the model we need to impose a resource constraint. The resource
constraint is that the world sum of counter-factual capital stocks is equal to the existing
world endowment of reproducible capital, or
∑
K∗i =
∑
Ki =
(
PMPKi
PMPK∗
) 1
1−αi
Ki. (7)
Taking the values for PMPKi calculated in the previous section, the only unknown in
(7) is PMPK∗, which can be solved for with a simple non-linear numerical routine.
To recap, PMPK∗ is the common world rate of return to capital that would prevail if
the existing world capital stock were allocated optimally.22
3.1 Counterfactual Capital Stocks
With the counterfactual world rate of return, PMPK∗, at hand we can use equation
(6) to back out each country’s assigned capital stock when rates of return are equalized.
As with our initialMPK calculations, four variations are calculated. The base version,
labeled MPKN , is calculated under the assumption that Pk = Py and uses the total
share of capital, not correcting for natural capital (i.e. it sets βij = 0). MPKL
21In particular, our experiment is consistent with wage equalization across sectors, but also with
models in which inter-sectoral migration frictions imply fixed proportional wedges among different
sectors’ wages.
22Removing the frictions that prevent PMPK equalization would almost certainly also lead to an
increase in the world aggregate capital stock. Our calculations clearly abstract from this additional
benefit, and are therefore a lower bound on the welfare cost of such frictions.
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is calculated using the share of reproducible capital rather than the share of total
capital. PMPKN allows for differences in prices. PMPKL includes both the price
adjustment and the natural capital adjustment. Figure 2 plots the resulting counter-
factual distributions of capital-labor ratios against the actual distribution. The solid
lines are 45-degree lines. Table 3 summarizes the change in capital labor ratios under
the various calculations for poor and rich countries.
Not surprisingly, under the naive MPK calculation, most developing countries
would be recipients of capital and the developed economies would be senders. The
magnitude of the changes in capital-labor ratios under this scenario are fairly spectac-
ular, with the average developing country experiencing almost a 300 percent increase.
In the average rich country the capital-labor ratio falls by 13 percent. These figures
remain in the same ball park when weighted by population. The average developing
country worker experiences a still sizable 206 percent increase in his capital endow-
ment. The average rich-country worker loses 19 percent of his capital allotment. The
scatter plots show that despite this substantial amount of reallocation, many devel-
oping countries would still have less physical-capital per worker, reflecting their lower
average efficiency levels (as reflected in the Xijs). Similarly, some of the rich countries
are capital recipients.
However when we correct the MPK for the natural capital share and relative
prices once again rich-poor differences are dramatically reduced. Either the price ad-
justment or the natural capital adjustment taken alone reduces the averaged weighted
gain in the capital stock to about 50% in the poor countries while the rich countries
lose about 5% of their capital stock. With both corrections in place the poor countries
actually lose capital to the rich countries.
3.2 Counterfactual Output
The effect on output of our counter-factual reallocation of the capital stock is easily
calculated. Substituting K∗ij into the production function (3), we get
Y ∗ij = Z
βij
ij (K
∗
ij)
αi(XijLij)
1−αi−βij =
(
PMPK∗
PMPKi
) αi
1−αi
Yij.
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Figure 2: Counterfactual Capital per Worker with Equalized Returns to Capital
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Notes: see Figure 1
Table 3: Average Changes in Equilibrium Capital Stocks under MPK Equalization
Unweighted Weighted by Population
Rich Countries Poor Countries Rich Countries Poor Countries
MPKN -12.9% 274.5% -19.3% 205.8%
MPKL -6.2% 86.6% -5.6% 59.3%
PMPKN 0.1% 71.8% -4.9% 52.0%
PMPKL 0.6% -10.6% 1.4% -14.5%
Notes: see Table 2
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Since all sectorial outputs go up by the same proportion, aggregate output also goes
up by the same proportion, and we have
Y ∗i =
(
PMPK∗
PMPKi
) αi
1−αi
Yi.
Hence, plugging values for αi, PMPKi and PMPK
∗ we can back out the counterfac-
tual values of each country’s GDP under our various MPK equalization counterfactu-
als. These values are plotted in Figure 3, again together with a 45-degree line. Table
4 summarizes the change in output per worker under the various calculations.
Changes in output in our counterfactual world are obviously consistent with the
result for capital-labor ratios. For our naive MPK measure, developing countries tend
to experience increases in GDP, and rich countries declines. The average developing
country experiences a 77 percent gain, while the average developed country only “loses”
3 percent. These numbers fall dramatically when adjustments are made for relative
capital prices and natural capital, with increases of less than 25% in both cases. For
the scenario with both adjustments, average output in the two groups is essentially
unchanged.
3.3 Dead Weight Losses
To provide a comprehensive summary measure of the deadweight loss from the failure
of MPKs to equalize across countries we compute the percentage difference between
world output in the counterfactual case and actual world output, or∑
i(Y
∗
i − Yi)∑
Yi
.
This can be calculated for each of our measures of the marginal product. Table 5
summarizes this calculation for our four calculation methods.
For the naiveMPK calculation, the result is in the order of 0.03, or world output
would increase by 3 percent if we redistributed physical capital so as to equalize the
MPK. This number is large. To put it in perspective, consider that the 28 developing
countries in our sample account for 12 percent of the aggregate GDP of the sample.
This result implies that the deadweight loss from inefficient allocation of capital is
in the order of one quarter of the aggregate (and hence also per capita) income of
developing countries.
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Figure 3: Counterfactual Output with Equalized Returns to Capital
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Table 4: Average Changes in Equilibrium Output per Worker under MPK Equaliza-
tion
Unweighted Weighted by Population
Rich Countries Poor Countries Rich Countries Poor Countries
MPKN -3.0% 76.7% -5.5% 58.2%
MPKL -0.7% 16.8% -1.0% 10.4%
PMPKN 1.1% 24.7% -1.0% 17.4%
PMPKL 0.7% 0.0% 0.4% -2.4%
Notes: see Table 2
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Table 5: World Output Gain from MPK Equalization
No Price Adjustment With Price Adjustment
No Natural-Capital Adjustment 2.9% 1.4%
With Natural-Capital Adjustment 0.6% 0.1%
Authors’ calculations.
Once one adjusts for price differences and natural capital, however, the picture
changes substantially. The natural-capital adjustment alone reduces the dead weight
loss to less than a quarter of the base case. The price adjustment alone reduces the
dead weight losses by over half. Taken together, the dead weight loss is negligible.
In these calculations, the natural-capital adjustment appears to be of greater
importance than the price adjustment. This was not the case for the MPK calcula-
tions. This is because the capital adjustment reduces the dead weight losses in two
ways. First, like the price adjustment, the natural-capital adjustment tends to reduce
the gap between rich and poor MPK. Unlike the price adjustment, the natural cap-
ital adjustment reduces the share of capital for our deadweight loss calculations for
all countries. This reduces the sensitivity of output to reallocations of capital and
reduces the dead weight losses further. This can be seen in Table 6 which lists the
counter-factual MPK for each of our cases.
Table 6: Counterfactual MPK under MPK Equalization
No Price Adjustment With Price Adjustment
No Natural-Capital Adjustment 12.7% 12.8%
With Natural-Capital Adjustment 8.0% 8.6%
Authors’ calculations.
The main implication of our results thus far is that given the observed pattern
of the relative price of investment goods and accounting for differences in the share
of reproducible capital across countries, a fully integrated and frictionless world cap-
ital market would not produce an international allocation of capital much different
from the observed one. Similarly, as shown in Figure 3, once capital is reallocated
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across countries so as to equalize the rate of return to reproducible-capital investment
(corrected for price differences and using the proper measure of capital’s share), the
counter-factual world income distribution is very close to the observed one. Hence, it
is not primarily capital-market segmentation that generates low capital-labor ratios in
developing countries. In the next section we expand on this theme.
4 Explaining Differences in Capital-Labor Ratios
Since we find essentially no difference in (properly measured) MPKs between poor
and rich countries, we end up siding with Lucas on the (un)importance of international
credit frictions as a source of differences in capital-labor ratios. But our results also
call for some qualifications to Lucas’ preferred explanation, namely that rich countries
had a greater abundance of factors complementary to reproducible capital, or higher
levels of TFP. These factors certainly play a role, but another important proximate
cause is the international variation in the relative price of equipment.
We cannot accurately apportion the relative contribution of prices and other
(Lucas) factors without data on each sector’s price Pij, efficiency, Xij, and natural-
capital share, βij. But a rough approximation to a decomposition can be produced by
focusing on a very special case, in which each country produces only one output good.
In this example, clearly, most countries import their capital.23 With this (admittedly
very strong) assumption, we can rearrange equation (5) to read
k∗i = Πi x Λi, (8)
where
Πi =
(
αi
PMPK∗
Py,i
Pk,i
) 1
1−αi
,
and
Λi =
[
zβii (Xi)
1−αi−βi
] 1
1−αi ,
where k∗i is the ratio of reproducible-capital to labor and zi is the ratio of natural-
capital to labor. The first term captures the effect of variation in relative prices (and
capital shares) on the capital-labor ratio. The second term captures the traditional
complementary factors identified by Lucas. In the simplest case where αi and the price
23As recently emphasized by Hsieh and Klenow (2003), the absolute price of equipment is essentially
constant across countries.
23
ratio are assumed to be the same in all countries, all the variance of capital per worker
in a world with perfect mobility would be due to differences in Λ.
In equation (8) the term Πi is available from our previous calculations, so we
can , back out the term Λi as k
∗
i /Πi. Following Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997)
we can then take the log and variance of both sides to arrive at the decomposition:
var [log(k∗)] = var [log(Π)] + var [log(Λ)] + 2 ∗ cov [log(Π), log(Λ)] .
The variance of log(k∗) for our PMPKL case is 2.46, the variance of log(Π) is 0.82,
the variance of log(Λ) is 0.61, and the covariance term is 0.52. If we apportion the
covariance term across Π and Λ equally this suggests that 54% of the variance in k∗
is due to differences in Π and 46% is due to differences in Λ. Each obviously plays a
large role and they are clearly interconnected (the simple correlation between them is
0.73).24
This should come as no large surprise. Hsieh and Klenow (2003) argue that dif-
ferences in the price ratio are due to relatively low productivity in the capital producing
sectors in developing countries. Since Λ in our formulation is comprised of an amal-
gam of human capital and total factor productivity, it should not be surprising that
low Λ correlates with an unfavorable price ratio. Similarly, the proportion of output
in land and natural resources will tend to be larger in poor countries, simply because
they produce less total output. With rising incomes we would expect to see that pro-
portion fall. The ultimate cause of differences in capital per worker may therefore be
productivity differences if productivity differences are the ultimate cause of differences
in capital costs and the share of capital. However, failure to account for these factors
will falsely suggest that financial frictions play a large role.
5 Time Series Results
In this section we attempt a brief look at the evolution over time of our deadweight
loss measures. The results should be taken with great caution for two reasons. First,
they are predicated on estimates of the capital stock. Since the capital stocks are a
function of time series data on investment, the capital stock numbers become increas-
ingly unreliable as we proceed backward in time. Second, our estimates of capital’s
24This analysis can also be done weighting the sample by population. The results are very similar
with about 50% attributed to each of Π and Λ.
24
share of income are from a single year, so changes over time are not reflected. This is
a particular problem in the case of the calculations corrected for natural capital. The
share of natural resources was particularly volatile during this period and this is not
properly accounted for in the results.
With these important caveats, Figure 4 displays the time series evolution of the
world’s deadweight loss from MPK differentials. We find little – or perhaps a slightly
increasing – long-run trend in the deadweight loss from failure to equalize MPKN .
Once prices are accounted for, however, it appears that the size of the deadweight
losses have fallen somewhat over time. Adding in the correction for natural capital
causes the trend to be clearly downward. This provides tentative evidence that the
deadweight loss from failure to equalize financial returns – the cost of credit frictions
– has fallen somewhat over time. This latter result is consistent with the view that
world financial markets have become increasingly integrated. 25
6 Conclusions
Macroeconomic data on aggregate output, reproducible capital stocks, final-good prices
relative to reproducible-capital prices, and the share of reproducible capital in GDP
are remarkably consistent with the view that international financial markets do a very
efficient job at allocating capital across countries. Developing countries are not starved
of capital because of credit-market frictions. Rather, the proximate causes of low
capital-labor ratios in developing countries are that these countries have low levels
of complementary factors and are inefficient users of such factors [as Lucas (1990)
suspected], and that they have high prices of equipment relative to output.
As a result, increased aid flows to developing countries are unlikely to have
much impact on capital stocks and output, unless they are accompanied by a return to
financial repression, and in particular to an effective ban on capital outflows in these
countries. Even in that case, increased aid flows would be a move towards inefficiency,
and not increased efficiency, in the international allocation of capital.
The above conclusions are based on observable factors. When one starts think-
ing about unobservables, however, it appears quite likely that our estimates are still
25The acceleration in the decline of the deadweight losses during the 1980s may reflect historically
low MPKs in developing countries during that decade’s crisis. If MPKs in poor countries were low
the cost of capital immobility would have been less.
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Figure 4: The Dead Weight Loss of MPK Differentials
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biased upward in developing countries. To see why, let us rewrite the arbitrage condi-
tion under free capital flows as
PyMPK
Pk
(1− tk) + (1− δ) = R∗(1− t∗), (9)
where tk is an “effective physical-capital income tax rate,” t
∗ as an “effective financial-
capital income tax,” and for simplicity we assume that each country produces only one
final good. While macroeconomists are not used to draw distinctions between types
of capital-income taxes, anecdotal evidence from developing countries suggests that
physical capital installed domestically is more easily targeted by the tax authorities
than various forms of financial investment, especially in offshore accounts. This is even
more likely if one takes a broad view of physical-capital income taxation that includes
expropriation by rent seeking governments, and of financial-capital income as more
easily hidden from the tax authorities.26
While we do not have direct data on tk and t
∗, it seems very likely that the former
is large in poor countries (partly as a result of corruption and rent seeking), and the
latter is smaller in poor countries (largely as the result of greater opportunities for tax
evasion). Combined with our result in this paper that PyMPK/Pk varies little across
countries, this implies that aid flows and financial repression in developing countries
may already have created a situation in which there is “too much” capital there. This
seems an area of potentially fruitful future research.
26Think about the relative attraction of investing in land and farm machinery vs Swiss bank accounts
in contemporary Zimbabwe.
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APPENDIX: Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A-1: Capital per Worker
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Figure A-2: Relative Prices
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Figure A-3: Total Capital’s Share of Income
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Figure A-4: Reproducable Capital’s Share of Income
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Table A-1: Data and Implied Estimates of the MPK
Country wbcode y k αw αk Py/Pk MPKN PMPKN MPKL PMPKL
Australia AUS 46,436 118,831 0.32 0.18 1.07 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.08
Austria AUT 45,822 135,769 0.30 0.22 1.06 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.08
Burundi BDI 1,226 1,084 0.25 0.03 0.30 0.28 0.08 0.03 0.01
Belgium BEL 50,600 141,919 0.26 0.20 1.15 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.08
Bolivia BOL 6,705 7,091 0.33 0.08 0.60 0.31 0.19 0.08 0.05
Botswana BWA 18,043 27,219 0.55 0.33 0.66 0.36 0.24 0.22 0.14
Canada CAN 45,304 122,326 0.32 0.16 1.26 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.07
Switzerland CHE 44,152 158,504 0.24 0.18 1.29 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.07
Chile CHL 23,244 36,653 0.41 0.16 0.90 0.26 0.24 0.10 0.09
Cote d’Ivoire CIV 4,966 3,870 0.32 0.06 0.41 0.41 0.17 0.08 0.03
Congo COG 3,517 5,645 0.53 0.17 0.23 0.33 0.07 0.11 0.02
Colombia COL 12,178 15,251 0.35 0.12 0.66 0.28 0.19 0.10 0.06
Costa Rica CRI 13,309 23,117 0.27 0.11 0.54 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.03
Denmark DNK 45,147 122,320 0.29 0.20 1.13 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.08
Algeria DZA 15,053 29,653 0.39 0.13 0.47 0.20 0.09 0.06 0.03
Ecuador ECU 12,664 25,251 0.55 0.08 0.84 0.28 0.23 0.04 0.03
Egypt EGY 12,670 7,973 0.23 0.10 0.30 0.37 0.11 0.16 0.05
Spain ESP 39,034 110,024 0.33 0.24 1.06 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09
Finland FIN 39,611 124,133 0.29 0.20 1.23 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.08
France FRA 45,152 134,979 0.26 0.19 1.20 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.08
United Kingdom GBR 40,620 87,778 0.25 0.18 1.07 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.09
Greece GRC 31,329 88,186 0.21 0.15 1.03 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05
Hong Kong HKG 51,678 114,351 0.43 0.90 0.19 0.18
Ireland IRL 47,977 85,133 0.27 0.18 1.05 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.11
Israel ISR 43,795 108,886 0.30 0.22 1.25 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.11
Italy ITA 51,060 139,033 0.29 0.21 1.08 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.08
Jamaica JAM 7,692 17,766 0.40 0.26 0.60 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.07
Jordan JOR 16,221 25,783 0.36 0.25 0.55 0.23 0.12 0.16 0.09
Japan JPN 37,962 132,953 0.32 0.26 1.12 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.08
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Table A-1: Data and Implied Estimates of of the MPK (cont.)
Country wbcode y k αw αk Py/Pk MPKN PMPKN MPKL PMPKL
Republic of Korea KOR 34,382 98,055 0.35 0.27 1.09 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.10
Sri Lanka LKA 7,699 8,765 0.22 0.14 0.47 0.19 0.09 0.12 0.06
Morocco MAR 11,987 15,709 0.42 0.23 0.49 0.32 0.16 0.18 0.09
Mexico MEX 21,441 44,211 0.45 0.25 0.73 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.09
Mauritius MUS 26,110 29,834 0.43 0.33 0.42 0.38 0.16 0.29 0.12
Malaysia MYS 26,113 52,856 0.34 0.16 0.81 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.06
Netherlands NLD 45,940 122,467 0.33 0.24 1.03 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.09
Norway NOR 50,275 161,986 0.39 0.22 1.14 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.08
New Zealand NZL 37,566 95,965 0.33 0.12 1.04 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.05
Panama PAN 15,313 31,405 0.27 0.15 0.87 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.06
Peru PER 10,240 22,856 0.44 0.22 0.89 0.20 0.18 0.10 0.09
Philippines PHL 7,801 12,961 0.41 0.21 0.68 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.09
Portugal PRT 30,086 71,045 0.28 0.20 0.97 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.08
Paraguay PRY 12,197 14,376 0.51 0.19 0.53 0.43 0.23 0.16 0.08
Singapore SGP 43,161 135,341 0.47 0.38 1.19 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.14
El Salvador SLV 13,574 11,606 0.42 0.28 0.51 0.49 0.25 0.32 0.17
Sweden SWE 40,125 109,414 0.23 0.16 1.19 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.07
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 24,278 30,037 0.31 0.08 0.62 0.25 0.15 0.06 0.04
Tunisia TUN 17,753 25,762 0.38 0.19 0.52 0.26 0.14 0.13 0.07
Uruguay URY 20,772 29,400 0.42 0.18 0.92 0.30 0.27 0.13 0.12
United States USA 57,259 125,583 0.26 0.18 1.16 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.09
Venezuela VEN 19,905 38,698 0.47 0.13 0.72 0.24 0.17 0.07 0.05
South Africa ZAF 21,947 27,756 0.38 0.21 0.48 0.30 0.14 0.17 0.08
Zambia ZMB 2,507 4,837 0.28 0.06 0.74 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.02
y: GDP per worker; k: reproducible capital per worker; αw: total capital share; αk: reproducible capital share; Py: final goods price
level; Pk: reproducible capital price level;MPKN : naive estimate of theMPK;MPKL: corrected for the share of natural-capital;
PMPKN : corrected for relative prices; PMPKL: both corrections. Authors’ calculations using data from Heston, Summers, and
Aten (2004), Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001), and World Bank (2006).
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